Securities Class Actions, Corporate Governance and Managerial Agency Problems

Preprint

1 January 1998

preprint
Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.104356

Abstract

This paper provides support for the proposition that securities class actions help solve agency problems. Two key findings support this conclusion. First, firms

Keywords

All Related Versions

Version 1, RePEc (Unconfirmed version)

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