Using the Machiavellianism instrument to predict trustworthiness in a bargaining game
- 28 November 2001
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 23 (1) , 49-66
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-4870(01)00067-8
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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