Defeating desert storm (and why Saddam didn't)

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Abstract
The single most important key to the Persian Gulf war coalition's success was Saddam Hussein's “stupifying strategic incompetence and military amateurishness,” which derived from a general ignorance of his adversaries’ will and capabilities. Saddam believed that the United States would not take what appeared to be tremendous risks in going to war to liberate Kuwait. These illusions were reinforced by the Bush administration's pre‐war behavior toward Iraq. An Iraqi leadership more conscious of American power, purpose, and policy in the Persian Gulf could have thwarted an effective U.S. military response to Iraq's conquest of Kuwait. Among other options, Saddam could have invaded the Saudi oil fields, withdrawn his forces from Kuwait before the UN deadline on January 15, 1991, or made a more determined effort to disrupt the coalition. Ultimately, however, what mattered to Saddam was his own personal and political survival. He could tolerate expulsion from Kuwait, but not an American march on Baghdad. In retrospect, Saddam's timing could not have been strategically worse, coming after the end of the cold war, but before Iraq had obtained nuclear capabilities that could have deterred U.S. military intervention.

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