On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring
- 1 October 1999
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Development Economics
- Vol. 60 (1) , 79-104
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-3878(99)00037-1
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
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