Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of Corporate Control
- 1 April 2000
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 55 (2) , 647-677
- https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00222
Abstract
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