Note—Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information Reanalyzed
- 1 March 1979
- journal article
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 25 (3) , 291-294
- https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.25.3.291
Abstract
This note reanalyzes the following problem, formerly treated by Wilson (Wilson, R. B. 1967. Competitive bidding with asymmetric information. Management Sci. 13 (July) 816–820): two parties have to submit bids for an object One of them knows the value with certainty, the other does not. The equilibrium derived differs from Wilson's solution and yields a simple explanation for the case cited by Wilson: the value of the game is essentially zero for the party with incomplete information.Keywords
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