An application of Public Choice Theory to the question of CAP reform

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Abstract
Given the difficulty of implementing reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), it seems worthwhile to consider new approaches to the problem, especially where these attach particular importance to the political feasibility of reform proposals. In this article, various aspects of public choice theory, or, as it is sometimes called, ‘the new political economy’ are applied to the CAP decision-making process to see what implications these have for reform prospects. In particular, public choice theory provides an explanation of why farmers are better able to organise interest groups and bring pressure to bear on the political system than consumers or taxpayers. It can also account for why the political system is often biased in favour of the demands of farmers, even where this involves heavy budgetary expenditure, and so may serve to suggest ways in which this bias may be corrected.

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