Institutional Investors and Information Asymmetry: An Event Study of Self‐Tender Offers
- 9 April 2003
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Financial Review
- Vol. 38 (2) , 197-211
- https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6288.00042
Abstract
Our research compares the asymmetric information costs of firms with low levels of institutional ownership to those with high levels. We use self‐tender offers as an information event. Our results show that higher institutional ownership, particularly a higher number of institutional investors, is associated with a lower degree of informed trading. These results persist even after we control for differences in trading activity among our sample firms.Keywords
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