Extending Market Power through Vertical Integration
Preprint
- 1 January 1999
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper derives a model of vertical integration when it is difficult to write binding long-term supply price contracts. Thus, a vertically separated monopoliKeywords
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