Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games
- 1 June 2003
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 51 (2) , 143-159
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(02)00092-6
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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