Dissent from “the new consensus”: Reply to Friedman

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Abstract
This is a rejoinder to some of the contentions of Part II of Jeffrey Friedman's monster article (or mini‐book?) about “The New Consensus.” After questioning his supposedly “non‐tendentious understanding of Marx,” it proceeds to deny that what Friedman calls Positive Libertarianism is any more a sort of libertarianism than imaginary or non‐existent cows are a kind of cows; and to insist that what Friedman calls morality is light years removed from the dutiful, domestic decencies of what would normally be considered moral conduct. Next it examines Friedman's misunderstandings of option rights, which actually presuppose only the weakest possible claims to equality. Finally it concludes with criticism of his bizarre and perverse assumption that concern about the consequences of our actions has little or nothing rather than almost everything to do with their morality.

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