Agency Theory and Executive Compensation: The Case of Chinese State‐Owned Enterprises
Top Cited Papers
- 1 July 2004
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Labor Economics
- Vol. 22 (3) , 615-637
- https://doi.org/10.1086/383109
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 38 references indexed in Scilit:
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