Industry-level emission trading between power producers in the EU
- 1 March 2002
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics
- Vol. 34 (4) , 523-533
- https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840110052163
Abstract
This paper investigates how restrictions for emission trading to the energy-intensive power sector will affect the magnitude and distribution of abatement costs across EU countries vis-à-vis a comprehensive EU emission trading regime. It is found that emission trading between European power sectors allows the harvest of a major part of the efficiency gains provided by full trade as compared to strictly domestic action. However, trade restrictions may create a more unequal distribution of abatement costs across member states than is the case for a comprehensive trade regime. The reason for this is that restricted permit trade enhances secondary terms-of-trade benefits to EU member countries with low marginal abatement costs at the expense of the other EU member states.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
- Cooling down hot air: a global CGE analysis of post-Kyoto carbon abatement strategiesEnergy Policy, 2000
- Energy Market Projections and Differentiated Carbon Abatement in the European UnionPublished by Springer Nature ,2000
- The Kyoto ProtocolPublished by Springer Nature ,1999
- Alternative CO2 abatement strategies for the European UnionPublished by Edward Elgar Publishing ,1998
- A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished by Place of Production (Une theorie de la demande de produits differencies d'apres leur origine) (Una teoria de la demanda de productos distinguiendolos segun el lugar de produccion)Staff Papers, 1969