The Process of Discovery
- 1 June 1985
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 52 (2) , 207-220
- https://doi.org/10.1086/289240
Abstract
The main argument of this paper is that philosophical difficulties regarding scientific discovery arise mainly because philosophers base their arguments on a flawed picture of scientific research. Careful examination of N. R. Hanson's treatment of Kepler's discovery not only puts the rationality of this discovery beyond question, it also reveals what its rationality consists in. We can retrieve the point stressed by Hanson concerning the rational character of discoveries such as Kepler's even as we reject the type of “logical” analysis he proposes.Keywords
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