Moving Forward in Bioethical Theory: Theories, Cases, and Specified Principlism

1 October 1992

journal article
research article
Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Medicine and Philosophy

Vol. 17 (5) , 511-539
https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/17.5.511

Abstract

The field of bioethics has deployed different models of justification for particular moral judgments. The best known models are those of deductivism, casuistry, and principlism (under one, rather limited interpretation). Each of these models, however, has significant difficulties that are explored in this essay. An alternative model, suggested by the work of Henry Richardson, is presented. It is argued that specified principlism is the most promising model of justification in bioethics.

Keywords

This publication has 4 references indexed in Scilit:

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Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 1991
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Main Trends in Recent Philosophy: Two Dogmas of Empiricism
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