Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures
Open Access
- 1 September 1995
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 39 (1) , 3-43
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(94)00823-j
Abstract
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This publication has 25 references indexed in Scilit:
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