The limits of rent seeking: why protectionists become free traders

1 January 1998

journal article
research article
Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy

Vol. 5 (1) , 38-63
https://doi.org/10.1080/096922998347642

Abstract

This article presents the argument that governments can mitigate the political risks associated with significant liberalization of trade by suggesting that under certain conditions, rent-seeking opponents of trade liberalization may actually turn into critically important allies of governments attempting major policy shifts from protectionism to free trade. It argues that where domestic rent seekers are persuaded that the government cannot or will not provide sufficient rents, they may pursue a second-most-preferred strategy that entails attempting to secure access to cheaper factor inputs and access to foreign markets by actively supporting trade liberalization.

Keywords

This publication has 1 reference indexed in Scilit:

The Business Council on National Issues and the Canadian State
Studies in Political Economy, 1987