Entry Restrictions, Industry Evolution, and Dynamic Efficiency: Evidence From Commercial Banking
- 1 April 1998
- journal article
- research article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 41 (1) , 239-274
- https://doi.org/10.1086/467390
Abstract
This article shows that bank performance improves significantly after restrictions on bank expansion are lifted. We find that operating costs and loan losses decrease sharply after states permit statewide branching and, to a lesser extent, after states allow interstate banking. The improvements following branching deregulation appear to occur because better banks grow at the expense of their less efficient rivals. By retarding the "natural" evolution of the industry, branching restrictions reduced the performance of the average banking asset. We also find that most of the reduction in banks' costs were passed along to bank borrowers in the form of lower loan rates.All Related Versions
This publication has 1 reference indexed in Scilit:
- Banks with Something to Lose: The Disciplinary Role of Franchise ValueSSRN Electronic Journal, 1996