Conscription, peace‐keeping, and foreign assistance: NATO burden sharing in the post‐cold war era
- 1 March 1997
- journal article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Defence and Peace Economics
- Vol. 8 (1) , 101-121
- https://doi.org/10.1080/10430719708404871
Abstract
This article examines burden-sharing behavior from the mid-1970s to 1994 using conscription-adjusted data. Except for the Reagan defense build-up in the early 1980s, actual defense burdens are not significantly different than average derived defense burdens. There is little sign of the exploitation hypothesis during this flexible-response era. In the 1990s, peace-keeping missions perform more like a pure public good and display some evidence of the exploitation of the large ally by the small. NATO foreign assistance abides by the joint product model and does not imply exploitation. Dramatic changes in the 1990s appear to reinforce the tendency towards equitable burden sharing, experienced from the start of the flexible-response era.Post-Cold War era, joint product model, peace-keeping, exploitation hypothesis, foreign assistance, conscription, flexible response, public good,Keywords
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