Against Restitution
- 1 October 2003
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies
- Vol. 51 (3) , 542-557
- https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00440
Abstract
Recently, states and other institutions have undertaken to make restitution for past abuses. Distinctions need to be made between various kinds of restitutive practices that rest on quite different normative grounds. Moreover, the core idea of restitution, in attaching obligation to particular historically grounded relationships, is questionable, and what is being attempted is better explained and justified in terms of a number of standard principles of justice of a non-restitutive kind; for although there is, in principle, a clear case of restitutive justice, its elements rarely, if ever, exist in the real world in an unmixed state. Although there are significant objections to deriving local obligations from principles of universal justice, they have no force in this case. Policies termed ‘restitutive’ may well be justifiable, but they are misdescribed.Keywords
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