An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Reply
- 1 February 2018
- journal article
- editorial
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 108 (2) , 561-563
- https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20171408
Abstract
In a comment, Okamoto (2018) identifies and corrects a misspecification of the rationing rule in Ausubel (2004). This reply elaborates on the observation that the optimality of truthful bidding in dynamic auctions may be sensitive to the fine details of the rationing rule. It then discusses the wider role of sequential bid processing in restoring truthful bidding.This publication has 3 references indexed in Scilit:
- An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: CommentAmerican Economic Review, 2018
- An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple ObjectsAmerican Economic Review, 2004
- COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERSThe Journal of Finance, 1961