The domestic‐international conflict nexus: New evidence and old hypotheses

Abstract
The extent to which domestic political disputes erupt into larger, generally regional, interstate conflicts is examined for the period 1948–1976. Two broad categories of behavior are possible: 1) the externalization of domestic instability and conflict in order to reduce difficulties at home and 2) the internalization of regional or interstate conflict through external penetration or internal politicization of foreign policy. Both alternatives turn out to be myths. Empirically, over the range of post‐1948 experience, there is no evidence to support the notion that as a consequence of high levels of domestic turmoil and conflict, a nation‐state will export foreign conflict behavior in the form of involvement in a serious international dispute. Neither is the internalization hypothesis supported for the bulk of the cases considered. We do find, however, that more powerful nations are more likely to be involved in a serious international dispute while at the same time experiencing a high level of domestic conflict.

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