N-person games and the evolution of co-operation: A model based on predator inspection in fish
- 1 January 1990
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 142 (1) , 123-135
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-5193(05)80017-7
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 23 references indexed in Scilit:
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