Procedural Choice and the House Committee on Rules
- 1 February 1996
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Politics
- Vol. 58 (1) , 25-53
- https://doi.org/10.2307/2960347
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 18 references indexed in Scilit:
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