Taking “enduring” out of enduring rivalry: The rivalry approach to war and peace
- 1 November 1995
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Interactions
- Vol. 21 (3) , 291-308
- https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629508434870
Abstract
Enduring rivalries form the most conflict‐prone dyads in the international system, but they are only the extreme case of rivalry; rivalries can be short‐lived as well as enduring. Rivalries are not merely a new topic of research—an extension of the logic behind studying “dangerous dyads"—nor are they merely a useful research tool and case selection device. Part of what has hindered a clear understanding of the wide‐ranging ramifications of the rivalry concept comes from the focus on enduring rivalries. We show that much can be gained by taking “enduring” out of enduring rivalries—resulting in what we term the “rivalry approach” to war and peace. There are three general ways in which the rivalry approach focuses attention on issues normally beyond the horizon of the traditional international conflict literature, or what might generically be labeled the causes of war approach: changing the unit of analysis from war to rivalry, adopting a longitudinal and dynamic approach, and putting rivalry context as part of theory rather than merely as a case selection device. We explore these three aspects of the rivalry approach, illustrating our points primarily by reference to scholarly work on deterrence, but also drawing on other examples from neorealism, expected utility, liberalism, arms races, power transitions, diffusion, and long cycles in order to illustrate the broader applicability of the framework.Keywords
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