Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry*
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- 1 August 2000
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 115 (3) , 989-1017
- https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300554962
Abstract
This paper examines evidence of the role that reputation plays in determining contractual outcomes. We conduct an empirical analysis of the Indian cuKeywords
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This publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
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