The Pareto Argument for Inequality
- 1 January 1995
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Social Philosophy and Policy
- Vol. 12 (1) , 160-185
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s026505250000460x
Abstract
Some ways of defending inequality against the charge that it is unjust require premises that egalitarians find easy to dismiss—statements, for example, about the contrasting deserts and/or entitlements of unequally placed people. But a defense of inequality suggested by John Rawls and elaborated by Brian Barry (who themselves reject the premises that egalitarians dismiss) has often proved irresistible even to people of egalitarian outlook. The persuasive power of this defense of inequality has helped to drive authentic egalitarianism, of an old-fashioned, uncompromising kind, out of contemporary political philosophy. The present essay is part of an attempt to bring it back in.Keywords
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