Time-consistent policy and persistent changes in inflation
- 30 November 1995
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 36 (2) , 329-350
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(95)01218-4
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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