The U.S.‐Russian HEU agreement: Internal safeguards to prevent diversion of HEU

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Abstract
Under the U.S.‐Russian HEU agreement,∗ approximately 500 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from large‐scale dismantlement of former Soviet nuclear warheads will be transformed into products not usable in nuclear weapons. According to the agreement, Russian facilities will convert and blend down HEU to low‐enriched uranium hexafluoride, which will subsequently be fabricated by U.S. companies into low‐enriched uranium (LEU) fuel for nuclear reactors. However, HEU is vulnerable to insider diversion during processing operations. The paper describes the principal HEU diversion vulnerabilities at the plant, and recommends a strong internal preventive safeguards system.

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