Abstract
This article represents a critical analysis of the major policy responses to workplace health and safety in Canada. It examines the deficiencies inherent in the legislative development of Joint Health and Safety Committees in most Canadian jurisdictions, the limitations regarding standard-setting of worker exposure to contaminants, and disincentive for employers to positively improve the workplace because of Workers Compensation legislation. Collective bargaining agreements in Canada have had only limited positive effects, while the ultimate legal sanction of criminal prosecution by the regulatory agencies has weakened enforcement and compliance of existing regulations. There has never been a successful criminal prosecution of an employer in Canada, even for multiple deaths. The article suggests the following four reasons for this “underdevelopment” of occupational health and safety in Canada: (1) the concealment of the dimension of the incidence of industrial disease based on Workers Compensation Board statistics; (2) the application of an incorrect theory of causation of both industrial disease and injury by both managers and government administrators of occupational health and safety programs; (3) the resistance of both senior and middle managers against increased worker participation in both work organization and job design questions; and (4) the general “moral underdevelopment,” rather than ignorance, of managers in favoring economic considerations or values at the expense of worker health and safety. In light of the magnitude of the problem and the deficiencies of existing policy approaches, the author proposes the need for greater workplace democratization of production and industry as a necessary and sufficient reform of workplace health and safety.

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