Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation
- 1 November 1994
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 23 (6) , 533-548
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)90011-6
Abstract
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All Related Versions
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
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