Pre-play Communication and Credibility: A Test of Aumann's Conjecture
Preprint
- 1 January 1998
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
The effectiveness of pre-play communication in achieving efficient outcomes has long been a subject of controversy. In some environments, cheap talk may help toKeywords
All Related Versions
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