General training under asymmetric information

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Abstract
One widely accepted conclusion in the human capital literature on training is that firms will finance only firm-specific training because it is non-transferable to other firms. Firms will not be willing to finance training in general (transferable) skills. In this paper it is argued that a recruiting firm will possess only limited knowledge of the training level in general skills acquired by workers in other firms. Hence a worker with transferable skills who changes employer can expect to suffer a cut in wages for a transition period while his level of productivity is being evaluated and recognized. Such a worker has no incentive to move as long as the present value of the loss in earnings is greater than the present value of the loss incurred in remaining with the training firm at a wage below the market-level for his skill. This result may have some important policy implications in countering the effects of market imperfections. It also suggests that training certification, in facilitating inter-firm mobility, discourages on-the-job training by firms.
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