Motivational bases of the public goods problem.

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Abstract
Compared 2 motivational bases for not contributing to a public good, desire to "free ride" (or greed) and fear of being a "sucker," among 110 Japanese undergraduates. It was hypothesized that these 2 types of motivation would be activated under different situations. When a public good was provided conjunctively, fear would have a strong effect but greed would not; when a public good was disjunctively provided, greed would have a strong effect but fear would not. In addition, it was predicted that the greater mutual trust existing among friends would make them contribute more than strangers would in the conjunctive condition but would make no difference in the disjunctive condition. Three types of production rules, in which a public good was conjunctively, disjunctively, or additively produced on the basis of members' contributions, were experimentally created. Half of the groups in each condition consisted of total strangers, and the other half consisted of friends. The hypotheses were supported when the size of the public good (bonus points) was relatively large. Also, Ss responded similarly in the conjunctive condition and in the additive condition. (25 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

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