Bidding Lower with Higher Values in Multi-Object Auctions
Preprint
- 1 January 2002
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Multi-object auctions differ in an important way from single-object auctions. When bidders have multi-object demand, equilibria can exist in which bids decreaseKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
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