The Political Economy of Imperfect Competition
- 1 May 1985
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Public Policy
- Vol. 5 (2) , 169-186
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x00003019
Abstract
Economic actors command political power as well as economic power. It is used to the same effect to create monopolies and oligopolies. The two powers can be combined; e.g., aside from monopolies based only on economic power or only on government intervention, there are especially powerful monopolies that command both powers. The stability of the various power holders is related to the nature of their power base; pure economic power is particularly unstable. However, economic power can be more readily amassed than interventionist power, which violates norms, and has a sharply declining marginal utility. When the effects of interventionist power are added to those of economic power, economies such as America, which are often classified as quite competitive, turn out to be much less so.Keywords
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