The expected stop-out price in a discriminating auction
- 31 December 1989
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 31 (2) , 133-137
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(89)90186-9
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 4 references indexed in Scilit:
- Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of AuctionsEconometrica, 1981
- The Efficient Diversification of Bids in Treasury Bill AuctionsThe Review of Economics and Statistics, 1979
- Bidding Theory and the Treasury Bill Auction: Does Price Discrimination Increase Bill Prices?The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1966
- Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed TendersThe Journal of Finance, 1961