Power in a Theory of the Firm
- 1 May 1998
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 113 (2) , 387-432
- https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555630
Abstract
Transactions take place in the firm rather than in the market because the firm offers power to agents who make specific investments. Past literatureKeywords
All Related Versions
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