Retail contracting and costly monitoring: Theory and evidence
- 1 April 1996
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 40 (3-5) , 923-932
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(95)00101-8
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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