Fiscal exchange, collective decision institutions, and tax compliance
- 1 December 1993
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 22 (3) , 285-303
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(93)90003-8
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:
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