Means, ends, and public ignorance in Habermas's theory of democracy
- 1 January 2003
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Critical Review
- Vol. 15 (1-2) , 23-58
- https://doi.org/10.1080/08913810308443573
Abstract
According to the principles derived from his theory of discourse ethics, Habermas's model of deliberative democracy is justified only if the public is capable of making political decisions that advance the common good. Recent public‐opinion research demonstrates that the public's overwhelming ignorance of politics precludes it from having such capabilities, even if radical measures were taken to thoroughly educate the public about politics or to increase the salience of politics in their lives.Keywords
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