Judging the Risk of Banks: Why Can't Bond Raters Agree?
Preprint
- 1 January 1999
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
If bank risk were transparent to the market, the protection and regulation of banks would be unnecessary. I argue that banks are opaque, and that the veil is iKeywords
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