Sophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games
Top Cited Papers
- 1 May 2002
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 104 (1) , 137-188
- https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2002.2927
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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