Weighting of Votes in an International Assembly

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Abstract
All the plans for future world organization, whether they envisage a world government or are limited to providing agencies for better collaboration between the peoples of the world, are built around two main conceptions—a small council and a larger assembly. But the different plans disagree widely upon the powers and the make-up of these bodies. The purpose of the present article is to analyze the difficulties relating to the structure of the larger body, the assembly, and to outline a tentative method for surmounting them. The structure of the different international organizations existing in the past was based on two principles: equality of representation and unanimity. That meant, first of all, that in the assemblies of nations the United States of America (population, 131 million) and Luxemburg (population, 300 thousand) had the right of equal representation. For instance, in the Conferences of the International Labor Organization, both countries have been equally entitled to appoint four delegates. Secondly, when an international assembly has tried to arrive at a Decision, not only the largest but also the smallest country could block such a Decision by casting a negative vote. While sometimes a little country has been forcibly persuaded to abandon its opposition, in many instances small countries have been able to frustrate the efforts of international assemblies and conferences otherwise unanimous.

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