Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
Open Access
- 1 July 1992
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Economic Studies
- Vol. 59 (3) , 561-579
- https://doi.org/10.2307/2297864
Abstract
This paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long-run player whose choice of stage-game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents. We obtain lower and upper bounds on the long-run player's payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the game. If the long-run player's stage-game strategy is statistically identified by the observed outcomes, then for generic payoffs the upper and lower bounds both converge, as the discount factor tends to 1, to the long-run player's Stackelberg payoff, which is the most he could obtain by publicly committing himself to any strategy.Keywords
This publication has 0 references indexed in Scilit: