III. On the necessary truth of certain conclusions obtained by means of imaginary quantities

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Abstract
Amongst the various objections urged against mathematical science, few oppose its evidence and logical accuracy; and, since its demonstrations have been acknowledged to proceed by a series of the strictest inferences, from the most evident principles, the study of abstract science has generally been deemed peculiarly proper to habituate the mind to just reasoning. But of late, the dissentions of mathematicians have subjected to doubt, even this “collateral and intervenient use;” for, not only has the mode of applying analysis to physical objects been controverted, but certain parts of the pure mathematics have become the subject of dispute. Much has been heard of the science of quantity being vitiated with jargon, absurdity, and mystery, and perplexed with paradox and contradiction; so that, from the very complaints of the patrons of mathematics, its opponents may derive their most potent arguments, and abundant matter for triumphant invective. The introduction of impossible quantities, is assigned as a great and primary cause of the evils under which mathematical science labours. During the operation of these quantities, it is said, all just reasoning is suspended, and the mind is bewildered by exhibitions that resemble the juggling tricks of mechanical dexterity.

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