Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
- 1 February 1983
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 29 (1) , 1-21
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90120-5
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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