Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- 1 January 1985
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 19 (3) , 227-229
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90026-6
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
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- The Prisoner's Dilemma and Dynamical Systems Associated to Non-Cooperative GamesEconometrica, 1980
- Strong perfect equilibrium in supergamesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1980
- Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterionJournal of Economic Theory, 1979
- Acceptable points in games of perfect informationPacific Journal of Mathematics, 1960