Were the Good Old Days That Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression
- 1 April 1999
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 54 (2) , 435-469
- https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00114
Abstract
We document that ownership by officers and directors of publicly traded firms is on average higher today than earlier in the century. Managerial ownership has risen from 13 percent for the universe of exchange‐listed corporations in 1935, the earliest year for which such data exist, to 21 percent in 1995. We examine in detail the robustness of the increase and explore hypotheses to explain it. Higher managerial ownership has not substituted for alternative corporate governance mechanisms. Lower volatility and greater hedging opportunities associated with the development of financial markets appear to be important factors explaining the increase in managerial ownership.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 42 references indexed in Scilit:
- Outside directors and CEO turnoverPublished by Elsevier ,2002
- Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysisPublished by Elsevier ,2002
- Executive stock ownership and performance tracking faint tracesJournal of Financial Economics, 1997
- Log-rolling and economic interests in the passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariffCarnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 1996
- RETHINKING RISK MANAGEMENTJournal of Applied Corporate Finance, 1996
- Financial innovation and the management and regulation of financial institutionsJournal of Banking & Finance, 1995
- Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United StatesJournal of Political Economy, 1994
- Private benefits from block ownership and discounts on closed-end fundsJournal of Financial Economics, 1993
- The Market Mechanism as an Incentive SchemeThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1983
- A Study of Corporation SecuritiesHarvard Law Review, 1934