Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code to Influence Chief Executive Officer Compensation
- 1 April 2002
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Labor Economics
- Vol. 20 (S2) , S138-S175
- https://doi.org/10.1086/338677
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 19 references indexed in Scilit:
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